Affirmative Action\u27s Affirmative Actions: A Reply to Sander by Ho, Daniel E
Reply
Affirmative Action's Affirmative Actions:
A Reply to Sander
Daniel E. Ho
I am grateful to Professor Sander for his interest in my work and his
willingness to pursue a valid answer to the critical question of the effects of
law school tier on bar performance. Sander's readiness to respond to my
Comment' demonstrates the importance of the questions at hand and his
openness to progress on these issues. Fortunately, progress is possible,
because, as I show here, the impressive-sounding points in Sander's
Response 2 violate basic methodological principles and are incorrect.
Sander points to certain descriptive facts that my Comment does not
dispute. Black students appear to fail the bar at higher rates than white
students. It also appears that "blacks and whites with similar law school
grades (when controlling for school and entering credentials) have virtually
identical graduation and bar outcomes." '3 However, these descriptive
observations are irrelevant to the causal question of whether going to a
higher-tier law school causes black students to fail the bar. As my Comment
and this Reply demonstrate, black law students who are similarly qualified
when applying to law school perform equally well on the bar irrespective of
what tier school they attend. There is no evidence that affirmative action
reduces the bar performance of the students it is designed to help. The
descriptive facts Sander presents may account for some of the reasons for
affirmative action, but they do not address the consequences of affirmative
* All analyses presented in this Reply are available at http://www.yalelawjournal.org.
1. Daniel E. Ho, Scholarship Comment, Why Affirmative Action Does Not Cause Black
Students To Fail the Bar, 114 YALE L.J. 1997 (2005).
2. Richard H. Sander, Mismeasuring the Mismatch: A Response to Ho, 114 YALE L.J. 2005
(2005).
3. Id. at 2006 (emphasis added).
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action. Here, I respond to each of Sander's points in turn.
First, Sander's control group, as he conceives it, is invalid. As I noted
in my Comment, every law school examined practices some form of
affirmative action, so the data is not informative about the broad effects of
affirmative action. Instead, we may investigate the effects of attending a
higher-tier law school. In response, Sander asserts that white students are
the control group and black students are the treatment group, because only
blacks were admitted under a system of affirmative action.4 This conception
is incorrect, because black students could differ from white students in all
sorts of respects that are not due to affirmative action or law school tier.
This flaw is akin to assigning estrogen to a group of women and a placebo
to a group of men, and inferring the effect of estrogen on health outcomes
by comparing women and men. The black/white test score gap has been
documented across a host of fields, so other differences (like primary
school education, family structure, or culture) may be at work.5 Comparing
blacks and whites in order to infer the causal effect of law school tier
ignores all of these other differences between these groups and thereby
provides an invalid estimate of the causal effect.6
Second, Sander asserts that controlling for law school grades does not
bias the estimate of the causal effect of law school tier. He does not take
issue with the rule of inference that controlling for a consequence of the
cause is never justified and will never produce the right causal effect. 7 This
rule is undisputedly violated here, because Sander's analysis itself
demonstrates that going to a higher-tier law school decreases law school
grades8 and that law school grades are correlated with bar passage. 9
Sander's responses to this basic flaw do not withstand scrutiny.
Standardizing grades within schools is no solution, because the same
student may receive lower grades in a higher-tier school even if she learned
the same amount. Moreover, the fact that law school GPA is the variable
with the biggest effect in Sander's regressions l° is not surprising at all. In
fact, it is an indicator of the problem: This coefficient reflects the fact that
his regression is controlling away the consequences of law school tier, the
4. Id.
5. See THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds.,
1998).
6. Sander himself recognizes this problem, finding it necessary to argue that "being black" is
not an "independently significant causal factor" determining bar passage outcomes. Richard H.
Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV.
367, 447 (2004). The coefficient on being black is only insignificant in the original bar passage
regression, however, when Sander (incorrectly) controls for law school grades. Id. at 444.
7. See GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 78 (1994); PAUL R. ROSENBAUM, OBSERVATIONAL STUDIES 73-74 (2d
ed. 2002).
8. Sander, supra note 6, at 373.
9. Id. at 443.
10. See Sander, supra note 6, at 443; see also Sander, supra note 2, at 2007.
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key causal variable. As my Comment demonstrates, omitting law school
grades from the original regressions leads the coefficient on law school tier
to be indistinguishable from zero and the coefficient on black students to be
substantially negative. This result shows that within Sander's analysis there
is no detectable effect of law school tier and that preexisting credentials
alone do not account for the black/white bar passage gap.
To further investigate this issue, Sander now proposes a structural
equations model." This represents a different approach based on different
assumptions from the original article, whereas the whole point of my
reanalysis was to reduce the role of unfounded and unnecessary
assumptions. Sander's discussion fails to do precisely what my Comment
aimed to achieve, namely, to clarify the assumptions in substantively
meaningful ways in order to validly infer a causal effect. Clarifying the
assumptions of Sander's structural equations model shows that it in fact
supports each of my Comment's main points: (1) that we cannot control for
law school grades in estimating the causal effect of tier, (2) that white
students are an invalid control group, and (3) that there is no detectable
effect of law school tier on bar passage. To verify this, note that the path
diagram itself readily admits post-treatment bias by the arrows from tier to
law school GPA to bar passage. As a result, the total effect in this path
diagram simply represents the coefficient of tier in a bar passage
regression, 12 (correctly) excluding law school GPA. In addition, the model
eliminates white students, making it inconsistent with Sander's (invalid)
"organiz[ation] around a comparison of 'treatment' blacks ... and 'control'
whites." 13 Most importantly, applying this exact structural model to the
original data set and variables yields a tier effect that is indistinguishable
from zero.
14
If this model supports all of the points in my Comment, why has it been
introduced? Not only has Sander's Response changed the assumptions and
the model, but it has also changed the outcome variable from eventual bar
passage, as defined in his original article, to first-time bar passage.
15
Applying this structural model to the original outcome variable of eventual
11. Id. at 2007-08.
12. See Paul W. Holland, Causal Inference, Path Analysis, and Recursive Structural
Equations Models, 18 SOC. METHODOLOGY 449, 457 (1988).
13. Sander, supra note 2, at 2006.
14. This is estimated with a linear probability model of bar passage controlling for LSAT
score and undergraduate GPA, excluding gender, because that is what is depicted in Sander's path
diagram. Using a logistic regression or including gender does not alter the fact that the tier
coefficient is insignificant in the original data set. Although Sander has not provided sufficient
information, he appears to have applied ordinary least squares for a dichotomous outcome, which
is wrong in part because predictions are not even bounded to the unit interval.
15. Although Sander describes the outcome as "whether a person passes the bar on one of her
first two attempts," Sander, supra note 6, at 444, the user's guide for the data indicates that this
variable actually represents eventual bar result, see LINDA F. WIGHTMAN, USER'S GUIDE: LSAC
NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL DATA FILE 15 (1999).
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bar passage, we find no tier effect. With the recoded outcome, the model
does lead to a borderline significant effect of tier, but not at the significance
level of .01 that Sander reports for all other coefficients. 6 The marginal
effect of going to a higher-tier law school in this model is roughly a 2.4%
increase in the probability of first-time bar passage, plus or minus 2.5% at a
99% confidence level.' 7 This effect is neither statistically distinguishable
from zero nor close to explaining the substantial black/white bar passage
gaps as Sander originally claimed. (Recall that bar passage gaps are as large
as 21% in the index range defined by Sander.)' 8 And of course if one
conducts enough tests, with enough specifications, measures, models, and
recoding, one can induce a statistically significant result even if the
relationship is random (classic "Type 1 error"). Indeed, this problem of
"model dependence" is precisely what matching methods are designed to
remedy. Using exact matching for Sander's newly defined outcome, thereby
eliminating unjustified assumptions, the conclusion remains the same: Tier
has no detectable effect on first-time bar passage for students who are
similar in all other respects.
Third, Sander asserts that my analysis "ignores law school
performance."' 9 My analysis excludes law school grades precisely because
it investigates the causal effect of law school tier on bar passage. I do not
dispute Sander's finding that going to a higher-tier law school reduces
grades. Such a finding isn't surprising-after all, we would expect that a
higher-tier law school presents a more competitive environment. Moreover,
I do not dispute that law school grades are correlated with bar passage.
Precisely for these reasons, we cannot control for law school performance
to assess the causal effect of law school tier. This is a textbook example of
bias induced by controlling for a consequence of the cause.
Sander also makes two specific criticisms of my analysis, each of which
applies equally to his original analysis. First, Sander claims that law school
tier is mismeasured and hence that the results of my analysis do not prove
much.2° Yet if law school tier, the key causal variable, is mismeasured, the
original analysis fails as well. Sander cannot have it both ways: The
assumptions required to interpret the matching estimates causally are
uniformly less onerous than those for his regression analysis. Asserting
that the assumptions are violated proves the point that Sander's original
inference that law school tier causes black students to fail the bar cannot
16. The fact that all individual coefficients in this path diagram are statistically significant at
.01 does not mean that the total effect of tier is.
17. This substantive effect is glossed over by standardization, which does not accord with a
substantive quantity of interest and does not make the estimates comparable. See Gary King, How
Not To Lie with Statistics: Avoiding Common Mistakes in Quantitative Political Science, 30 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 666, 669-74 (1986).
18. Sander, supra note 6, at 446.
19. Sander, supra note 2, at 2009.
20. Id.




Second, Sander argues that there are unobservable differences between
similarly qualified students that invalidate matching.22 As I stated in my
Comment, unobservable differences in these students would invalidate both
my reanalysis and Sander's analysis.23 Both matching and regression
assume that there are no remaining unobserved differences in students of
different tiers when holding constant pretreatment variables.24 Unless the
researcher gathers more data (as in my accompanying paper,25 which
controls for 170 additional covariates), we have no idea what impact
unobservables might have on the estimates. Sander's claim that matching
maximizes bias along unobservables compared to regression is a conjecture
without any theoretical basis. The claim depends on the correlation between
unobserved and observed variables, and as such it cannot be tested in the
data.26 For example, if higher-tier students have a higher (unobserved)
underlying propensity to take the bar in "tough" jurisdictions like California
or New York, the true causal effect of law school tier could actually be
positive if we do not control for region.27 In short, Sander's charge of
unobserved variables concedes that the estimates of his own original
analysis are unfounded.
If matched students cannot be viewed as anywhere close to randomly
assigned to any reliable measure of law school tier,28 then we cannot put
credence in the estimates of the causal effect of law school tier presented by
Sander or my Comment. The purpose of outlining the hypothetical
experiment is to lay bare such critical assumptions for drawing a causal
inference, thereby permitting scholars to assess the credibility of the
estimates, which is what my Comment aimed to achieve.
21. Sander asserts that matching "singles out those pairs of students for whom 'tier' is least
meaningful and most biased." Id. at 2010. If students differ in unobservable respects, however, we
cannot attribute differences in bar passage rates to law school tier at all.
22. Id.
23. Ho, supra note 1, at 2001.
24. To be clear, some regression techniques account for some types of unobserved
heterogeneity, but not the logistic regression employed by Sander.
25. Daniel E. Ho, Evaluating Affirmative Action in American Law Schools: Does Attending
a Better Law School Cause Black Students To Fail the Bar? (Mar. 9, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.yalelawjoumal.org and http://people.iq.harvard.edu/-dho/
research/sander.pdf.
26. The standard advice in the literature is to first obtain balance on observables and then to
conduct sensitivity analyses to examine to what degree inferences would change if some
unobserved variable were correlated to the treatment and the outcome. In such an analysis,
inferences could certainly change, but the actual truth cannot be ascertained from the data,
because the data is by definition observed. See Paul R. Rosenbaun & Donald B. Rubin, Assessing
Sensitivity to an Unobserved Binary Covariate in an Observational Study with Binary Outcome,
45 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC'Y SERIES B (METHODOLOGICAL) 212 (1983).
27. Cf P.J. Bickel et al., Sex Bias in Graduate Admissions: Data from Berkeley, 187 SCIENCE
398 (1975) (reversing a finding of gender discrimination in graduate school admissions by
controlling for academic department).
28. See Sander, supra note 2, at 2010.
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To conclude, I want to underscore one basic point of agreement with
Sander: The empirical investigation of affirmative action is important and
should be subjected to scientific scrutiny. The fortunate fact is that we are
not alone in this venture. Tools for analysis have been developed across
academic fields, providing some easy fixes to reassess the mismatch
hypothesis with more credible and theoretically consistent assumptions.
This reanalysis shows that similarly qualified black students perform just as
well on the bar irrespective of law school tier. Of course, law school tier
may affect many other outcomes, like public service, life satisfaction, and
career success, each of which merits independent investigation. This data
set thereby provides a great opportunity for legal scholars to capitalize on
developments in other academic disciplines, helping us to better understand
the effect of law school tier and possibly of affirmative action.
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